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Sustainable tourism modelling: Pricing decisions and 
evolutionary stable strategies for competitive tour operators 
 
Abstract 
This paper considers competitive tour operators (TOs) who may select traditional tourism strategy 
(strategy T) or green tourism innovation strategy (strategy G) and addresses the following important 
issues using evolutionary game models: When would TOs facing environment-friendly tourists adopt 
the strategy G? How do TOs set product prices under different strategy combinations? How can 
government effectively motivate TOs to pursue green tourism? Our research results show that a green 
tourism innovation pioneer could monopolize the market under certain conditions. Furthermore, when 
environmental preference of tourists is sufficiently low, no TOs would adopt the strategy G; when it is 
moderate, only the TO with cost advantage (stronger TO) would adopt the strategy G; when it is 
sufficiently high, both TOs would select the strategy G. Our research also demonstrates that the 
stronger TO implements the strategy G mostly independent of the rival’s decisions, but the opposite is 
true for the TO with cost disadvantage (weaker TO). We further investigate potential government 
subsidies that can motivate TOs to carry out green tourism simultaneously. Our results suggest that to 
be more effective, the government should first offer green subsidy to highly competitive tourism 
locations and/or more innovative TOs. 
 








Tourism has become an important part in many countries around the world. China is no 
exception to this trend. China has witnessed fast growth with an average growth rate 12% in 
tourism income and about 10% of the total consumption of Chinese was on tourism related 
products in 2015 (Liu et al., 2017). As one of the driving forces of China’s service industry, 
tourism industry plays a significant role in promoting economic growth. However, many 
scholars have argued that economic growth and industrial development in developing 
countries mainly rely on excessive resource consumption, leading to low energy efficiency 
and high emissions (Adriana, 2009; Carrillo et al., 2014). In particular, tourism industry 
consumes a lot of natural resources, and brings about a large number of disposable products, 
resulting in severe contamination of air, oceans, soil, fresh-water and so on (Chu and Chung, 
2016; Fong et al., 2017; Han and Yoon, 2015). In order to achieve sustainable development, 
we should carefully consider the potential negative impacts of tourism consumption on the 
environment. For instance, the problems of haze pollution, global warming, ozone depletion, 
and greenhouse effect are particularly serious in China (Hou et al., 2017). Fortunately, as 
people have become more environmentally conscious, many countries around the world, 
including China, have advocated green tourism focusing on eco-friendly tourism service 
products. As an example, the Chinese government has been advocating “low carbon tourism” 
when developing the tourism industry into a strategic pillar industry of the national economy1. 
In realities, product strategy plays a critical role in the survival and success of a firm 
because it can determine the firm’s orientation of the business activities and expand its market 
share. Enterprises often adopt strategies such as low price and/or product differentiation 
strategy to capture more market shares (Agrawal and Bellos, 2016; Zhu and He, 2016). With 
the continuous improvement of people's living standards, consumers have growing interests 																																																								1State Council. (2009). The suggestions of promoting tourism industry. Issued by State Council, No.41.	
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on tourism nowadays (Chan et al., 2014). Meanwhile, thanks to some governments’ great 
efforts on environmental protection, people also increasingly prefer green products and 
services. Many researchers have pointed out that consumers would like to pay extra for green 
products and services (Abdallah et al., 2012; Zhu et al., 2007; Zhang et al., 2017). As a 
consequence, successful firms often require their managers to consider not only the quality of 
products and services but also other aspects such as consumers' environmental preference 
(Buckley, 2012). Research and Development (R&D) of environmental products is one of the 
important issues of sustainable operations (Lee and Min, 2015). So far, many industries have 
adopted green product strategy to meet and exceed the social environmental standards 
(Loiseau et al., 2016). Nevertheless, tourism firms offering green service products face higher 
cost in green innovation and/or waste disposal. Therefore, a tour operator (TO) has to make a 
trade-off between profit and the cost of being green and decide whether to implement green 
tourism innovation according to the market. Different from physical products, the tourism 
service products are produced while being used by tourists. As Vargo and Lusch (2008) 
argued, consumers are not only the buyers of the services, but also the co-producers or 
co-creators of service value. Thus, the additional green tourism cost is often related to the 
demand volume (such as unit carbon emission reduction), which differs from the situation for 
the green physical product innovation (Wong, 2013).  
In practice, decision-making is oftentimes not one-shot and decision makers are not 
completely rational. They would constantly adjust their strategies after observing competitors' 
actions and finally select a stable strategy. This is the core idea of Evolutionary Game Theory 
(Weibull, 1997). This tool is highly applicable to our research as the tourism industry is 
constantly evolving with tourists’ increasing environmental awareness. Therefore, we will 
construct evolutionary game models to analyze the dynamic system’s Evolutionary Stable 
Strategy (ESS), which, if adopted by a population in a given setting, cannot be invaded by any 
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alternative strategy (Smith and Price, 1973). Considering the characteristics of tourism service 
products, we will study the strategic interaction of TOs’ green tourism innovation and aim to 
answer the following important questions:  
（1）	Under what conditions would TOs adopt the strategy G? And what are the optimal 
product prices for TOs in different competitive settings?  
（2）	How do the environmental preference of tourists and initial states of TOs adopting the 
strategy G influence the ESS of TOs? 
（3）	Under what circumstance can the government subsidy effectively motivate the TOs to 
implement green tourism? And how does the government green subsidy affect the ESS 
of TOs? 
To address the above-mentioned questions, we first derive the demand functions based 
on the classical Hotelling model where we also incorporate the environmental preference into 
tourists’ utility function. We then establish a one-shot duopoly game model and two 
evolutionary game models consisting of two asymmetrical TOs. By analyzing these models, 
we obtain the optimal prices, demands and profits of TOs and identify the evolutionary stable 
conditions. Furthermore, we propose possible government subsidies that can effectively 
motivate TOs to implement green tourism innovation. Our analysis and results show that the 
weaker TO may adopt the strategy G when the environmental preference of tourists is 
moderate or high, but it is significantly affected by the stronger TO’s decisions. The stronger 
TO makes product decisions mainly depending on his profit and rarely considering his rival’s 
decisions. We further conclude that when the environmental preference of tourists is 
sufficiently low, both TOs will adopt the strategy T; when it is moderate, only the stronger 
TO will adopt the strategy G; both will adopt the strategy G when it is very high. Our findings 
also suggest that the government start by selecting highly competitive tourism locations 
and/or more innovative TOs to implement green subsidy policy.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the 
representative studies closely related to our research. We then describe the research problem 
and derive the demand functions in the third section. Section ‘One-shot duopoly game among 
TOs’ characterizes the one-shot duopoly game of TOs. In section	 ‘Evolutionary analysis of 
TOs’, the ESSs of TOs are explored. Section	 ‘ESS of TOs with government subsidy’ 
examines the effect of government subsidy on the ESS of TOs. We conclude the paper in the 
last section where we also present some avenues for future research.                 
Literature review  
In this section, we will review the representative literature from three research areas: 
green innovation strategy, sustainable tourism and pricing in tourism industry.                              
Green innovation strategy  
Many researchers have studied green innovation management (see Agrawal and Bellos, 
2016; Blanco et al., 2009). They confirm that it is difficult for enterprises to pursue green 
innovation activities when consumers have lower environmental awareness. Hansen and 
Birkinshaw (2007) indicate that innovation value differs from firm to firm and suggest that 
firms decide on innovation according to their own specific situations. Ghosh and Shah (2012) 
establish game-theoretic models to investigate the effect of channel structures on product 
greenness, prices and profits considering green production cost and consumer sensitivity on 
green apparel. They propose a two-part tariff contract to coordinate the green channel. 
Carrillo et al. (2014) develop a dual channel model to analyze the influence of customer 
environmental sensitivity on its supply channels. They suggest that policy makers consider 
the disparate effect on different industries for carbon tax schemes. Dai and Zhang (2017) 
investigate the green process innovation and dynamic pricing setting under carbon tariff and 
emission cap. They find that carbon tariff could reduce product 
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profit and social welfare, but could increase foreign price. Some researchers have shown that 
government regulations could effectively motivate firms to carry out green innovation from a 
short-term perspective (e.g., Droste et al., 2016; Kammerer, 2009; Qi et al., 2010; Wang et al., 
2017). For example, Droste et al. (2016) explore the institutional conditions that promote the 
transition towards sustainability under government intervention. They point out that 
government intervention could facilitate social innovation towards sustainability. Wang et al. 
(2017) examine the effects of insurance subsidy on clean production innovation. They 
demonstrate that green insurance can't improve product innovation and profit, but can reduce 
risk. Additionally, some studies (Osloob and Foumani, 2017; Kuchukova et al., 2016) 
consider the innovation performance of firms and their roles in the markets. In short, the 
above-mentioned papers show that green operations of an enterprise could improve its 
core-competitiveness and contribute to sustainability. Nevertheless, the majority of the 
previous studies focus on the optimal prices and green levels assuming participants are 
perfectly rational. Furthermore, all of them are unrelated to the choice of green tourism 
innovation strategy.  
Sustainable tourism  
Many scholars (e.g., Chen and Tung, 2014; Dunk et al., 2016; Suriñach and Wöber, 2017) 
have paid more attention to sustainable tourism management and point out that tourism 
industry brings about a lot of disposable products, which can lead to soil and water pollution. 
Also, some studies (De Vita et al., 2015; Katircioglu et al., 2014) focus on the links between 
tourism development and environmental quality. Adriana (2009) investigates the 
environmental protection issues in tourism supply chains. Their findings indicate that public 
pressures can promote the adoption of green supply chains but organizational factors and 
strategic myopia of players can hinder the implementation of sustainable tourism. Chan et al. 
(2014) collect data through a survey from 438 hotel employees in Hong Kong and examine 
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the effects of three green triggers: environmental knowledge, environmental awareness and 
environmental concern. They demonstrate that these three triggers are positively associated 
with the ecological behavior of tourists. Xu and Fox (2014) note that any movement towards 
sustainable tourism needs to consider all key stakeholders in the process. Integrating several 
essential variables (environmental awareness, perceived effectiveness, and eco-friendly 
behavior) into tourists’ environmental preference, Han and Yoon (2015) find that the 
incorporated construct plays a vital role in hotel guests' decisions. Rahman and Reynolds 
(2016) establish a comprehensive model of consumers’ behavioral decisions and examine the 
interaction among consumers’ biospheric value, their willingness to sacrifice for environment, 
and their behavioral intentions. They conclude that biospheric value would influence 
consumers' willingness to sacrifice for the environment. Wang et al. (2017) assess the 
recreation carrying capacity of the environment attributes considering the willingness to pay 
of tourists for environmental products and identify the carrying capacity threshold for each 
specific attribute. He et al. (2018) set up a dynamic evolutionary game model among local 
governments, tourism enterprises and tourists. They then develop an effective green incentive 
mechanism for government to develop traditional tourism into green tourism. The majority of 
these previously mentioned papers mainly investigate the relationship between tourists and 
sustainable development. However, as a key stakeholder of sustainable tourism, TOs’ pricing 
and/or product strategies will significantly influence tourists’ purchasing decisions when 
choosing tourism service products (Huang et al., 2010; Lee and Min, 2015). This is a feature 
specifically incorporated in our research.    
Pricing in tourism industry 
Some research papers have analyzed the pricing decisions in the tourism service industry 
(e.g., Guo and He, 2012; Song et al., 2009; Taylor, 1998; Zheng, 1997). Chung (2000) 
modifies a prisoner's dilemma game model to examine the pricing strategy and business 
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performance of hotels and obtain the pricing policies in different situations. Lockyer (2005) 
investigates the perceived importance of price when selecting hotel accommodation and 
identifies the price trigger points that would influence the purchasing behavior of tourists. 
García and Tugores (2006) construct a vertical differentiation duopoly model considering 
both quality and price competition in the hotel industry. They derive the optimal quality and 
price decisions. Huang et al. (2010) study the pricing strategies in competitive tourism supply 
chain and point out the rational reactions of each sector under different strategies. Abrate et al. 
(2012) study the dynamic pricing strategy for hotels and show that the type of customer, the 
star rating and the number of suppliers with available rooms can affect the pricing structure. 
Guo et al. (2013) explore the optimal pricing strategy for hotels when managers operate an 
online channel by cooperating with a third party website and propose a coordination 
mechanism for the stakeholders to achieve a win-win outcome. Dong et al. (2014) study the 
pricing and cooperative strategies between tour operators and hotels located at a tourism 
destination. They find that the tour operators would bid a lower wholesale room price to the 
hotel with higher capacity and vice versa. Yang et al. (2016) discuss a two-echelon tourism 
supply chain consisting of a hotel and an online travel agency by comparing sequential game 
with price competition. Long and Shi (2017) investigate the optimal pricing strategies of a 
tour operator and an online travel agency when they adopt the O2O model through online sale 
and offline service cooperation. They find that service level, unit sale commission, cost 
coefficient and unit service compensation coefficient have different influences on pricing 
decisions of the tour operator and online travel agency. Most of these papers mainly study 
price competition among tourism participants. Our research differs by focusing on the 
strategic choices of green tourism innovation and pricing policies simultaneously in 
sustainable tourism. 
Furthermore, differently from the existent literature, our study incorporates the 
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environmental preference of tourists into the horizontal competition model under bounded 
rationality assumption. We analyze the pricing decisions and the strategic interaction of TOs’ 
green tourism innovation. Moreover, we aim to find out when government subsidy policy can 
promote green tourism. To our best knowledge, these issues have not yet been addressed in 
the literature of tourism management. 
Problem description and demand functions 
In this section, we first describe the research problem and relevant assumptions, and then 
derive the demand functions in different competitive situations using the Hotelling model. 
Different from the basic Hotelling model, we take the effect of tourists’ environmental 
preference into account.                   
Problem description 
In our models, we consider two horizontal competitive tour operators (TOs) who sell 
tourism products to the end consumers (tourists). Each TO can choose between the traditional 
tourism strategy (strategy T) and the green tourism innovation strategy (strategy G). When 
both TOs adopt the traditional tourism strategy (TT), only price competition between them is 
present. When only one of them chooses the green tourism innovation strategy (TG or GT), it 
is obvious that the TO who adopts the strategy G is more competitive among eco-conscious 
tourists. The two TOs are assumed to move simultaneously playing a Nash game and they can 
constantly adjust their decisions by observing and learning their rival’s strategies. We also 
assume that all parameter information is completely transparent for all participants and the 
government only subsidizes the green tourism enterprises (if any).            
Demand functions 
In this subsection, we will derive the demand functions in different competitive 
situations. We consider the Hotelling duopoly with linear transportation cost and full market 
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coverage, where tourists are uniformly distributed over the interval [0,1] with density equal to 
one (Hotelling, 1929). It is assumed that the stronger TO (TO 1) stands in the point 0 and the 
weaker TO (TO 2) lies at the point 1. Furthermore, we assume that every tourist just buys one 
unit of the green or non-green product, enjoying the following net surplus:  𝑢!! = 𝑣 +𝑚𝑘𝑒 − 𝑝!! − 𝑡𝑥!            𝑢!! = 𝑣 + 𝑛𝑘𝑒 − 𝑝!! − 𝑡(1− 𝑥!)                       (1) 
Where 𝑢!! (𝑖 = 1,2; 𝑗 = 𝑇𝑇,𝐺𝑇,𝑇𝐺,𝐺𝐺) denotes the visitors’ utility by purchasing the 
tourism service product from TO 1 or TO 2 under different competitive situations. Parameter 𝑣 is the basic utility of tourism service product, which is the same for all tourists. Parameter 𝑝!! denotes the sale price set by TO 𝑖. Notation 𝑥! represents the tourists’ distance to the 
TO 1 and 𝑡 > 0 is the marginal cost of transportation or product differentiation. Parts 𝑚𝑘𝑒 
and 𝑛𝑘𝑒 measure the effect of tourists’ environmental preference due to the 𝑒 provided by 
TOs, where 𝑚 and 𝑛 are binary variables. 𝑚 = 0 (𝑛 = 0) means the TO 1 (TO 2) adopts 
the strategy T, while 𝑚 = 1 (𝑛 = 1) denotes that the TO1 (TO2) adopts the strategy G. 
Parameter 𝑒 represents the product greenness provided by TOs. Note that we just consider 
identical and exogenous product greenness to focus on discussing the effect of different green 
innovation ability of each TO. Parameter 𝑘 denotes the environmental preference of tourists. 
The higher the 𝑘 is, the more the potential green tourists are. 
Under the assumption of full market coverage, when the TOs compete only on price, i.e., 
no one adopts the strategy G, the tourists’ utility by purchasing traditional tourism products 
from TO 1 and TO 2 is respectively: 𝑢!!! = 𝑣 − 𝑝!!! − 𝑡𝑥!! and 𝑢!!! = 𝑣 − 𝑝!!! − 𝑡(1−𝑥!!). Furthermore, the derivation of market demands requires identifying the indifferent 
consumer located at 𝑥!!∗  such that: 𝑢!!! = 𝑢!!! , namely, 𝑣 − 𝑝!!! − 𝑡𝑥!!∗ = 𝑣 − 𝑝!!! −𝑡(1− 𝑥!!∗). Therefore, we can obtain the demand of TO 1 as 𝐷!!! = 𝑥!!∗ = !!!!!!!!!!!!! , and 
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the demand of TO 2 as 𝐷!!! = 1− 𝑥!!∗ = 1− !!!!!!!!!!!!! . When TO 1 adopts the strategy G 
while TO 2 chooses the strategy T, the utility of tourists buying green product from TO 1 is 𝑢!!" = 𝑣 + 𝑘𝑒 − 𝑝!!" − 𝑡𝑥!"  while 𝑢!!" = 𝑢!!! . Setting 𝑢!!" = 𝑢!!" , we can derive the 
demand function of each TO as: 𝐷!!" = 𝑥!"∗ = !!!"!!!!"!!!!"!!  and 𝐷!!" = 1− 𝑥!"∗ = 1−
!!!"!!!!"!!!!"!! . In the TG strategy scenario, we can know that the tourists’ utilities are 𝑢!!" = 𝑢!!! and 𝑢!!" = 𝑣 + 𝑘𝑒 − 𝑝!!" − 𝑡(1− 𝑥!"). Using a similar method, we can obtain 
the demand of TO 1 as 𝐷!!" = 𝑥!"∗ = !!!"!!!!"!!!!"!!  and the demand of TO 2 as 𝐷!!" = 1−𝑥!"∗ = 1− !!!"!!!!"!!!!"!! . Under the GG scenario, the utilities of tourists buying products 
from TO 1 and TO 2 are: 𝑢!!! = 𝑢!!" and 𝑢!!! = 𝑢!!" . Finally, we can obtain the following 
demand functions: 𝐷!!! = 𝑥!!∗ = !!!!!!!!!!!!! , 𝐷!!! = 1− 𝑥!!∗ = 1− !!!!!!!!!!!!! . 
One-shot duopoly game among TOs 
In this section, we model the one-shot duopoly game between the TOs and derive the 
pricing decisions of green and/or non-green products under different competitive situations. 
As mentioned earlier, the treatment cost of green products is often related to the number of 
tourists, such as controlling carbon emission or waste disposal. Consistent with the literature, 
we model the unit variable cost of green tourism innovation as a quadratic function 𝜇!𝑒! 
(𝑖 = 1,2), where the 𝜇! is cost coefficient, representing the TO’s green innovation ability. 
The higher the 𝜇!, the lower the efficiency of TO’s green innovation. This quadratic function 
has been proved to be reasonable and widely used by many researchers (e.g., Guo et al., 2013; 
Long and Shi, 2017; Zhu and He, 2016). Furthermore, we further assume 𝜇! < 𝜇!, meaning 
that TO 1 has a cost advantage compared to TO 2. It is assumed that the other relative cost of 
the traditional/green tourism product except for the green tourism innovation cost is 𝑐!. As a 
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result, the unit average cost of traditional (green) tourism product is 𝑐! (𝑐! + 𝜇!𝑒!). To 
simplify the mathematic models, we assume 𝑐! = 0 without loss of generality due to the fact 
that parameter 𝑐! does not affect the main theoretical results of our models (Guo et al., 2013). 
Under some practical situations, tour managers may ignore the marginal cost of service (e.g., 
air seat, hotel room) when making operational decisions due to it is sunken investment. Hence, 
this simplification is reasonable to a large extent.   
We hereafter let the superscript ∗ denote the optimal solutions and 𝜋!! represent the 
profit of TO 𝑖 in different strategy combinations. We first study the price competition 
between TO 1 and TO 2 under TT strategy combination. Based on the demand functions 
derived earlier, the optimization problems of two TOs are:  max!!!! 𝜋!!! = 𝑝!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!        max!!!! 𝜋!!! = 𝑝!!!(1− !!!!!!!!!!!!! )                     (2) 
By solving Equation (2), the equilibrium prices of TOs are: 𝑝!!!∗ = 𝑝!!!∗ = 𝑡 and the 
profits of these TOs are expressed as: 𝜋!!!∗ = 𝜋!!!∗ = !!. It means that the TOs will set the 
same prices and attain equal market shares and profits. All proofs of the four strategy 
combinations are provided in Appendix A. 
Under the pressure of environmental protection, some enterprises may be motivated to 
implement green tourism innovation to attract more green tourists. Suppose that TO 1 selects 
the strategy G, while TO 2 chooses the strategy T. Based on the corresponding demand 
functions in subsection ‘Demand functions’, we can obtain the following profit functions of 
TOs: 𝜋!!" = (𝑝!!" − 𝜇!𝑒!) !!!"!!!!!!"!!"!!  and 𝜋!!" = 𝑝!!" 1− !!!"!!!!!!"!!"!! . Contrary to 
the GT strategy, if TO 1 selects the strategy T while TO 2 adopts the strategy G, the profit 
functions of two TOs are: 𝜋!!" = 𝑝!!" !!!"!!!!!!"!!"!!  and 𝜋!!" = (𝑝!!" − 𝜇!𝑒!) 1−
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!!!"!!!!!!"!!"!! . If both TOs adopt the strategy G, their profit functions can be expressed as: 𝜋!!! = (𝑝!!! − 𝜇!𝑒!)(!!!!!!!!!!!!! ) and 𝜋!!! = (𝑝!!! − 𝜇!𝑒!)(1− !!!!!!!!!!!!! ). Using a similar 
method as before, we can derive the optimal prices, demands and profits of TOs for the three 
cases above, which are also listed in Table 1.   
Table 1．Equilibrium solutions in different competitive situations 
 Strategy TT Strategy GT Strategy TG Strategy GG 𝒑𝟏∗  𝑡 (𝑒𝑘 + 3𝑡 + 2𝑒!𝜇!)3  (3𝑡 + 𝑒!𝜇! − 𝑒𝑘)3  (3𝑡 + 2𝑒!𝜇! + 𝑒!𝜇!)3  𝒑𝟐∗  𝑡 (3𝑡 + 𝑒!𝜇! − 𝑒𝑘)3  (𝑒𝑘 + 3𝑡 + 2𝑒!𝜇!)3  (3𝑡 + 𝑒!𝜇! + 2𝑒!𝜇!)3  𝒒𝟏∗  1/2 𝑒𝑘 + 3𝑡 − 𝑒!𝜇!6𝑡  3𝑡 + 𝑒!𝜇! − 𝑒𝑘6𝑡  3𝑡 − 𝑒!𝜇! + 𝑒!𝜇!6𝑡  𝒒𝟐∗  1/2 3𝑡 + 𝑒!𝜇! − 𝑒𝑘6𝑡  𝑒𝑘 + 3𝑡 − 𝑒!𝜇!6𝑡  3𝑡 + 𝑒!𝜇! − 𝑒!𝜇!6𝑡  𝝅𝟏∗  𝑡2 (𝑒𝑘 + 3𝑡 − 𝑒!𝜇!)!18𝑡  (3𝑡 + 𝑒!𝜇! − 𝑒𝑘)!18𝑡  (3𝑡 + 𝑒!𝜇! − 𝑒!𝜇!)!18𝑡  
𝝅𝟐∗  𝑡2 (3𝑡 + 𝑒!𝜇! − 𝑒𝑘)!18𝑡  (𝑒𝑘 + 3𝑡 − 𝑒!𝜇!)!18𝑡  (𝑒!𝜇! + 3𝑡 − 𝑒!𝜇!)!18𝑡  
To ensure that the equilibrium solutions of TOs under four competitive situations (TT, 
GT, TG, and GG) are all non-negative, the environmental preference of tourists should satisfy 
!!!!!!!! ≤ 𝑘 ≤ !!!!!!!!  and 𝑒!𝜇! ≤ 3𝑡 + 𝑒!𝜇! . These two conditions are the basic 
participation constraints of the two TOs. Comparing the solutions in different competition 
situations, we can have the following proposition.  
Proposition 1.  In the one-shot duopoly game: 
(1) When the environmental preference of tourists is very high (𝑘 > !!!!!!!!  for TO 1 or 𝑘 > !!!!!!!!  for TO 2), a green tourism innovation pioneer has an opportunity to 
monopolize the market by implementing the strategy G.  
(2) When both of TOs adopt the strategy G, environment-friendly tourists would pay higher 
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prices for green products (𝑝!!!∗ < 𝑝!!!∗ and 𝑝!!!∗ < 𝑝!!!∗) and the stronger TO will 
attract more tourists (𝑞!!!∗ > !! > 𝑞!!!∗). 
The proofs of Proposition 1 are straightforward by comparing the equilibrium solutions 
shown in Table 1. Proposition 1(1) indicates that the pioneer of green tourism innovation 
could monopolize the market when the environmental preference of tourists is high enough. 
Therefore, TOs facing environment-friendly tourists should adopt green tourism innovation 
earlier, or they may be squeezed out of the market. Proposition 1(2) shows that both TOs may 
pass parts of their innovation costs to the tourists resulting in higher sale prices, which is 
consistent with the reality that we must invest additional resources to promote sustainable 
development and environment-friendly tourists would pay extra for the green products 
(Abdallah et al., 2012; Zhu et al., 2007). Thanks to its cost advantage, TO 1 will set a lower 
price to win a larger market share as well as a larger profit. This implies that maintaining 
stronger innovation ability is always beneficial for companies to deal with an evolutional 
market. Notice that both TOs achieve lower profits in the GG scenario than the TT scenario. 
The reason behind is that they have to bear parts of green tourism innovation cost. 
Evolutionary analysis of TOs 
As previously mentioned, the one-shot strategy is not necessarily optimal for TOs under 
the bounded rationality assumptions when the game players’ decisions are interdependent. 
The TOs ultimately determine the optimal and stable equilibrium strategy by keeping learning 
and imitating competitors' tactics over time. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the strategy 
evolutionary process of each participant. In what follows, we will establish evolutionary game 
models to investigate the strategic interaction between the TOs. Since the profits of TOs are 
symmetric in the TT situation, for simplicity, we let 𝜋!!!∗ = 𝜋!!!∗ = 𝜋!! . Hence, the 
corresponding payoff matrix can be established, as shown in Table 2.  
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Table 2. Payoff matrix of TOs 
TO-1 TO-2 G-strategy (𝑦) T-strategy (1 − 𝑦) 
G-strategy (𝑥) (𝜋!!! ,𝜋!!!) (𝜋!!" ,𝜋!!") 
T-strategy (1 − 𝑥) (𝜋!!" ,𝜋!!")  (𝜋!! ,𝜋!!) 
It is assumed that the probability of TO 1 adopting strategy G is 𝑥, then that of TO 1 
selecting the strategy T is 1− 𝑥. Likewise, we let 𝑦 and 1− 𝑦 denote the probability of 
TO 2 adopting strategy G and strategy T, respectively. According to the replicator dynamic 
equation, the increasing rate !"/!"!  of the TO 1 adopting strategy G is equal to the difference 
between earnings 𝒂 • 𝐴! • 𝑦, 1− 𝑦 ! and the average revenue of the TOs (𝑥, 1− 𝑥) • 𝐴! •𝑦, 1− 𝑦 !where 𝒂 = (1,0) indicates that TO 1 adopts strategy G with a probability 1, and 
𝐴! denotes the profit matrix 𝜋1𝐺𝐺 𝜋1𝐺𝑇𝜋1𝑇𝐺 𝜋𝑇𝑇  of TO 1 (Yi and Yang, 2017). Consequently, we 
obtain the replicator dynamic equation for TO 1: 𝐹 𝑥 = !"!" = 𝑥 𝒂− 𝑥, 1− 𝑥 ∙ 𝐴! ∙ 𝑦, 1− 𝑦 !                (3) 
Where 𝐹 𝑥  represents the change rate of the TO 1 using strategy G. Furthermore, 𝐹′ 0 < 0 shows that the proportion of TO 1 selecting strategy G evolves to 0 over time, 
while 𝐹! 1 < 0 indicates that it evolves to 1 (Xiao and Chen, 2009). Equation (4) indicates 
that TOs would imitate and learn the behavior of achievers to generate higher profits. If the 
profit obtained by one TO who adopts the strategy G is higher than the average earnings of 
other strategies, the proportion of TO selecting this strategy increases; otherwise, the 
proportion decreases. According to Table 2, Equation (3) can be calculated and finally 
expressed as follows: 𝐹 𝑥 = !"!" = 𝑥 1− 𝑥 𝜋!!! + 𝜋!! − 𝜋!!" − 𝜋!!" 𝑦 + 𝜋!!" − 𝜋!!          (4) 
Similarly, the replicator dynamic equation of TO 2 is: 𝐹 𝑦 = !"!" = 𝑦 1− 𝑦 𝜋!!! + 𝜋!! − 𝜋!!" − 𝜋!!" 𝑥 + 𝜋!!" − 𝜋!!          (5) 
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The specific simplification processes are presented in Appendix B. 
Strategy stability analysis of TO1 
We first take TO 1 into consideration to demonstrate the dynamic evolutionary process. 
For lucidity and simplicity, we define ∆𝐿 ≝ 𝜋!!! − 𝜋!!" , ∆𝑛 ≝ 𝜋!!" − 𝜋!!  and the 
difference between ∆𝐿  and ∆𝑛  as ∆𝑚 ≝ ∆𝐿 − ∆𝑛 = 𝜋!!! + 𝜋!! − 𝜋!!" − 𝜋!!" . We let 𝑦∗ = − ∆!∆!, which leads to 𝐹 𝑥 = 0. It can be concluded from the above definitions that 𝑦∗ ≤ 1 . From Table 1, we can obtain ∆𝐿 = !!(!!!!!)(!"!!!!!!!!!!!!!!)!"! , ∆𝑛 = !(!!!!!)(!"!!!!!!!!)!"! , and ∆𝑚 = − !!(!!!!!)(!!!!!)!! , where the ∆𝐿 can be interpreted 
as the decision equation whether a TO should adopt the strategy G or not when the opponent 
has adopted the strategy G. Notation ∆𝑛 can be interpreted as the decision equation that 
helps the TO make a product strategy when his competitor has adopted the strategy T. ∆𝑚 
denotes the variation relationship between 𝐹 𝑥  and 𝑦. We have the following Proposition 2, 
which shows the strategy stability of TO 1. 
Proposition 2.   
(1) When !!!!!!!! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇!, 𝑥∗ = 0 is an ESS. When 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇!, 𝑥∗ = 1 is an ESS. 
(2) When 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < !!!!!!!! , if 𝑦 > 𝑦∗, 𝑥∗ = 0 is an ESS; if 𝑦 < 𝑦∗, 𝑥∗ = 1 is an ESS. 
(3) When 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < !!!!!!!! , and 𝑦 = 𝑦∗, any initial proportion of TO 1 adopting the 
strategy G is the ESS. 
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             (a) 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇!          (b) 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < !!!!!!!!        (c) 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < !!!!!!!! , and 𝑦 = 𝑦∗ 
Fig. 1. Strategy evolutionary paths of TO 1 
Note: The arrow direction represents the strategy evolutionary trend. 
From Proposition 2, we can attain the following results and use Fig. 1 to facilitate our 
discussion. Differentiating Equation (5) with respect to 𝑥, we can obtain 𝐹′ 𝑥 = 1−2𝑥 ∆𝑚𝑦 + ∆𝑛 . First, when !!!!!!!! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇!, it can be verified that ∆𝑚𝑦 + ∆𝑛 < 0 is 
true for any 𝑦, and 𝐹! 𝑥 |!!! < 0. In this case, TO 1 finally adopts the strategy T no matter 
what strategy TO 2 selects. While 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇!, we can find that ∆𝑚𝑦 + ∆𝑛 > 0 holds 
for any 𝑦, and 𝐹! 𝑥 |!!! < 0. This means that TO 1 would select the strategy G in the long 
run. In the above two cases, it is demonstrated that competition can’t affect the decision of 
green tourism innovation of TO 1. In other words, TO 1 can make product decisions without 
considering his competitor’s strategies. Second, when 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < !!!!!!!!  and 𝑦 ≠ 𝑦∗, we 
can infer that the competitor’s strategy might influence TO 1’s decision. Moreover, the higher 
initial proportion of TO 2 adopting the strategy G is, the lower proportion of TO 1 adopting 
the strategy G is. Namely, TO 1 would adopt opposite strategy from that of TO 2. In this 
scenario, the stronger TO has to consider the rival’s irrational decision. The possible reason is 
that when the environmental preference is very high, the weaker TO may adopt a disruptive 
price strategy to capture some market share due to his irrational behavior. As a result, the 
stronger TO may give up some parts of market share so as not to be subject to greater 
irrational competition. Third, when 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < !!!!!!!!  and 𝑦 = 𝑦∗, any strategy of TO 1 is 
stable. That means the proportion of TO 1 adopting strategy G does not change over time. To 
sum up, TO 1 makes a green tourism innovation decision mainly depending on his own 
profits and rarely considering his competitor’s strategy.  
Strategy stability analysis of TO2 
As in previous subsection, we can define ∆𝐿 ≝ 𝜋!!! − 𝜋!!", ∆𝑛 ≝ 𝜋!!" − 𝜋!! and the 
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decrement between ∆𝐿 and ∆𝑛 as ∆𝑚 ≝ ∆𝐿 − ∆𝑛 = 𝜋!!! + 𝜋!! − 𝜋!!" − 𝜋!!" . Moreover, 
we let 𝑥∗ = − ∆!∆!, which makes sure 𝐹 𝑦 = 0 except for 𝑦 = 0 or 𝑦 = 1. It can be 
proved that 𝑥∗ ≤ 1. According to Table 1 and after some simplifications, we can have ∆𝐿 = !!(!!!!!)(!"!!!!!!!!!!!!!!)!"! , ∆𝑛 = !(!!!!!)(!"!!!!!!!!)!"!  and ∆𝑚 = − !!(!!!!!)(!!!!!)!! .  
Proposition 3.   
(1) When !!!!!!!! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇!, then 𝑦 = 0 is the ESS.  
(2) When 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇!, if 𝑥 > 𝑥∗, 𝑦 = 1 is the ESS; if 𝑥 < 𝑥∗, 𝑦 = 0 is the ESS. 
(3) When 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < !!!!!!!! , if 𝑥 > 𝑥∗, 𝑦 = 0 is the ESS; if 𝑥 < 𝑥∗, 𝑦 = 1 is the ESS. 
(4) When 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇! or 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < !!!!!!!! , and 𝑥 = 𝑥∗, then any initial proportion of 
TO 2 adopting strategy G is the ESS. 
     
                    (a) 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇!              (b) 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < !!!!!!!!     
Fig. 2. Strategy evolutionary paths of TO 2 
 
Fig. 2 is used to illustrate our results. Proposition 3(1) shows that when the 
environmental preference of tourists is very low, TO 2 finally adopts the traditional tourism 
strategy without considering the decision of TO 1. This result is intuitive because the TO with 
cost disadvantage cannot capture enough market share to make up its green cost. When 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇!  (or 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < !!!!!!!! ) and 𝑦 ≠ 𝑦∗ , it can be concluded that TO 1’s 
strategy would significantly affect TO 2’s decision. Concretely, when 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇!, TO 2 
would like to adopt the same strategy with TO 1. Namely, TO 2 will follow TO 1 to 
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implement green tourism innovation when environmental preference is moderate. Conversely, 
when 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < !!!!!!!! , we can find that the higher initial proportion of TO 1 adopting 
strategy G, the lower that of TO 2 is. It promulgates that the ratio of TO 2 adopting strategy G 
is negatively related to that of TO 1 when environmental preference is relatively high. Finally, 
when 𝜇! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇! or 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < !!!!!!!!  (∆𝑚 ∙ ∆𝑛 < 0) and 𝑥 = 𝑥∗, any strategy of TO 
2 is stable. That is to say, the proportion of TO 2 adopting strategy G or T does not change 
over time. Contrary to TO 1, the TO 2 makes a product strategy largely depending on TO 1’s 
decision behavior.  
ESS analysis among TOs 
Based on the above analysis of strategy stability, we can conclude that each participant’s 
decision is influenced by the opponent’s strategy to some extent. In this subsection, we will 
discuss the ESS of TOs in different competitive situations. From the replicator dynamic 
Equations (4) and (5), we can see that this dynamic system has five possible equilibrium 
points: (0,0)(0,1)(1,0)(1,1) 𝑥∗,𝑦∗ . From the stability theorem of differential equation, when 
trace 𝑇𝑟𝐽 and determinant 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝐽 of the Jacobi matrix satisfy 𝑇𝑟𝐽 < 0 and 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝐽 > 0, the 
strategy is an ESS (Friedman, 1991). Therefore, we derive the Jacobi matrix 𝐽 of replicator 
dynamic equations of TOs as follows: 
𝐽 = !"(!)!" !"(!)!"!"(!)!" !"(!)!" = (1− 2𝑥)(∆𝑚𝑦 + ∆𝑛) 𝑥(1− 𝑥)∆𝑚𝑦(1− 𝑦)∆𝑚 (1− 2𝑦)(∆𝑚𝑥 + ∆𝑛)         (6) 
From the Jacobi matrix 𝐽, we can find the 𝑇𝑟𝐽 and 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝐽 as follows: 𝑇𝑟𝐽 = 1− 2𝑥 ∆𝑚𝑦 + ∆𝑛 + (1− 2𝑦)(∆𝑚𝑥 + ∆𝑛)                                                 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝐽 = 1− 2𝑥 ∆𝑚𝑦 + ∆𝑛 (1− 2𝑦)(∆𝑚𝑥 + ∆𝑛)− 𝑥(1− 𝑥)∆𝑚𝑦(1− 𝑦)∆𝑚   (7) 
By distinguishing the signs of 𝑇𝑟𝐽 and 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝐽, we can obtain the following Proposition 4, 
which demonstrates the ESS of TOs under different conditions. The relevant proofs are listed 
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in Appendix B. 
Proposition 4. 
(1) When !!!!!!!! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇!, 𝑥,𝑦 = (0,0) is the ESS; 
(2) When 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇!, 𝑥,𝑦 = (1,0) is the ESS; 
(3) When 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 <  !!!!!!!! , 𝑥,𝑦 = (1,1) is the ESS; 
(4) 𝑥,𝑦 = (0,1) or 𝑥∗,𝑦∗  is not the ESS under any condition; 
Proposition 4 shows the local stability of this system and its corresponding conditions. It 
is unlikely that both TOs adopt the strategy G in the long run when the environmental 
preference of tourists is low or moderate. Under the long-term repeated game, when the 
environmental preference is very low, both TOs will adopt the strategy T. However, if the 
environmental preference is sufficiently high, both will select the strategy G. The reasons are 
that when the tourists’ environmental preference is very low, the TOs cannot capture 
sufficient tourists to make up their green cost so that no TOs would participate in green 
tourism. This phenomenon is not uncommon in developing countries where the tourists are 
more sensitive to the price and have lower environmental awareness. On the contrary, if the 
tourists have higher environmental awareness, the tour firms will spontaneously conduct 
green tourism innovation under market competition. Note that when the environmental 
preference is moderate, the stronger TO will adopt the strategy G, but the weaker TOs may try 
to select strategy T to avoid directly completing with the stronger TO. The potential reason is 
that weaker TO is more sensitive to smaller markets and more susceptible to other firms' 
behavior. Past studies have indicated that adopting product differentiation strategy could 
improve a firm’s competitiveness and viability (Agrawal and Bellos, 2016; Zhu and He, 2016; 
Yi and Yang, 2017). This result also can be explained by Proposition 3, which shows that TO 
1’s decisions always influence TO 2’s. However, the stronger TO is more concerned about its 
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profit. After long-term imitating and learning behavior, TO 1 will conduct green tourism 
innovation due to its cost advantage. After understanding the TO 1’s decision, the TO 2 will 
adopt opposite strategy. In practical operation management, relatively weak TOs often focus 
on some small market for survival. The following Table 3 shows the strategy stability of TOs 
under the conditions mentioned in Proposition 4(1). Other proofs are shown in Appendix B.  
Table 3. The stability of each local equilibrium points under !!!!!!!! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇!. 
 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝐽 Sign 𝑇𝑟𝐽 Sign Local stability 
(0,0) ∆𝑛 ∙ ∆𝑛 + ∆𝑛 + ∆𝑛 − ESS 
(0,1) −∆𝐿 ∙ ∆𝑛 − ∆𝐿 − ∆𝑛 ± Saddle point 
(1,0) −∆𝐿 ∙ ∆𝑛 − ∆𝐿 − ∆𝑛 ± Saddle point 
(1,1) ∆𝐿 ∙ ∆𝐿 + −(∆𝐿 + ∆𝐿) + Unstable 
To validate the theoretical findings above and gain more managerial implications, we 
conduct numerical studies to depict the evolutionary paths of the dynamic system. According 
to Proposition 4, we set relevant parameters as 𝑡 = 0.1, 𝑒 = 1, 𝜇! = 0.4 and 𝜇! = 0.6. To 
observe the effect of tourists’ environmental preference, we let the parameter 𝑘 change over 
the interval [0.3, 0.73), and the initial proportion 𝑥! change from 0.1 to 0.9 with steps 0.2. 
Setting initial proportion 𝑦! as 0.2, 0.4,0.6, and 0.8, respectively, we can obtain Fig. 3.  
From Fig. 3, we can conclude that the dynamical system will evolve into ESS (0,0), ESS 
(1,0) or ESS (1,1) as environmental preference 𝑘 varies. To be more specific, when the 
environmental preference is very low, the system will evolve into local stability point (0,0). 
When the tourists’ environmental preference is moderate, it will evolve into local stability 
point (1,0). If the environmental preference is very high, the system will finally evolve into 
ESS (1,1). Furthermore, the initial ratio of each TO adopting the green tourism innovation 
strategy will not affect the final evolutionary states of this system, but it may influence the 
evolutionary trajectories. Notice that when the initial ratio is relatively low, the evolutionary 
speed of evolving into ESS (0,0) is relatively fast. On the contrary, it evolves into ESS (1,1) 
faster. It also depicts that the initial proportion of each TO selecting strategy T or G would 
influence the rival’s evolutionary speed and path, but the dynamical system will finally evolve 
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into the stable states in the long term. 
 
Fig. 3. The evolutionary diagram of the dynamical system with 𝑦! = 0.2, 0.4,0.6 and 0.8 
ESS of TOs with government subsidy 
Based on our analysis and discussions so far, we can conclude that when the tourists’ 
environmental preference is low or moderate, it is difficult to motivate two TOs to implement 
green tourism innovation simultaneously only because of market competition. This will 
hamper the further development of green tourism. Therefore, it is essential for the government 
to subsidize the TOs who implement green tourism innovation. We let parameter 𝑠 denote 
the subsidy implemented by government. The payoff matrix of TOs with government green 
subsidy is established in Table 4.  
Table 4. Payoff matrix of TOs with government green subsidy 
TO-1 TO-2 G-strategy (𝑦) T-strategy (1 − 𝑦) 
G-strategy (𝑥) (𝜋!!! + 𝑠,𝜋!!! + 𝑠) (𝜋!!" + 𝑠,𝜋!!") 
T-strategy (1 − 𝑥) (𝜋!!" ,𝜋!!" + 𝑠)  (𝜋!! ,𝜋!!) 
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From Table 4, using a similar method as before, we can obtain the replicator dynamic 
equation under government subsidy as follows: 𝐹 𝑥 ! = 𝑥 1− 𝑥 𝜋!!! + 𝜋!! − 𝜋!!" − 𝜋!!" 𝑦 + 𝜋!!" + 𝑠 − 𝜋!!𝐹 𝑦 ! = 𝑦 1− 𝑦 𝜋!!! + 𝜋!! − 𝜋!!" − 𝜋!!" 𝑥 + 𝜋!!" + 𝑠 − 𝜋!!         (8) 
Appendix C shows the simplification processes of Equation (8) and the Jacobi matrix 𝐽! 
and trace 𝑇𝑟𝐽! and determinant 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝐽!. By checking the signs of 𝑇𝑟𝐽! and 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝐽!, we can 
have the following Proposition 5, which reveals the ESS of TOs under different government 
subsidies. The relevant proofs are provided in Appendix C. 
Proposition 5. 
(1) When !!!!!!!! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇! , if 𝑠 < −∆𝑛 , government subsidy is almost ineffective; if −∆𝑛 < 𝑠 < −∆𝐿, the government subsidy is only effective for stronger TOs; only when 𝑠 > −∆𝐿 can the dynamic system evolve into the ESS (1,1). 
(2) When 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇!, the government should mainly subsidize weaker TOs and make 
sure that the subsidy satisfies 𝑠 > −∆𝐿 so that 𝑥,𝑦 = (1,1) is the ESS.     
According to Proposition 5, the government subsidy can influence the TOs’ decisions to 
a certain extent. Specifically, when the government subsidy is very low, it may only affect the 
TOs’ behavior in the short term, but it cannot work in the long term. Consequently, the TOs 
still pursue traditional tourism. When the government subsidy is moderate, it can motivate the 
stronger TO to adopt the strategy G, but it is invalid for the weaker TO. From this point, if the 
government has insufficient budget to subsidize tour firms, more attention should be paid to 
the TOs with higher innovative ability so that the other TOs may automatically implement 
green tourism innovation due to market competition. In this setting, the lowest subsidy 
offered by government is −∆𝑛. When the government subsidy is high enough to compensate 
for the green tourism innovation cost, both weaker and stronger TOs would like to select 
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green tourism. According to Proposition 5 (2), we can conclude that when the tourists’ 
environmental preference is moderate, the government should focus on encouraging the 
weaker TO to implement green tourism. The optimal subsidy of government is −∆𝐿, which 
can compensate for the green tourism innovation cost of the weaker TO. Thus, it is sensible of 
government to set up appropriate subsidy schemes for different situations. To sum up, the 
primary means is to motivate the stronger TOs to implement green tourism innovation when 
the environmental preference of tourists is relatively low. On the contrary, the government 
should mainly subsidize the weaker TOs when the environmental preference of tourists is 
relatively high.            
In order to further observe the strategy evolutionary trajectories of TOs and the effect of 
government subsidy, we employ numerical studies to better understand our theoretical 
findings. From Proposition 5, we set the same basic parameter values used in subsection ‘ESS 
analysis among TOs’ and 𝑘 = 0.35 for Fig. 4(a) and 𝑘 = 0.5 for Fig. 4(b). To focus on the 
impacts of the government subsidy on TOs’ decisions, we vary the subsidy level 𝑠 to 
observe the effectiveness of government subsidy in three possible scenarios: 𝑠 is very low 
(blue lines) or moderate (red lines) or relatively high (green lines). The illustration results are 
shown in Fig. 4 (a).  
 
(a) !!!!!!!! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇! 
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(b) 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 <  𝑒𝜇! 
Fig. 4. The evolutionary path diagram of the dynamical system with government subsidy change 
 
From Fig. 4, we can obtain the following managerial insights. When the government 
subsidy is very low, it can’t change the original evolutionary stable states, which means 
government subsidy is ineffective in this case. However, when the subsidy is high enough, the 
subsidy policy works to some extent. In particular, when the green subsidy is moderate, the 
dynamic system finally evolves into the ESS (1,0). In this scenario, the government subsidy 
policy can only motivate the stronger TOs to implement green tourism. When subsidy is more 
than −∆𝐿, it can motivate both TOs to adopt the strategy G even if the environmental 
preference of tourists is low or moderate. In short, only with sufficiently high subsidy level 
can the government successfully promote sustainable tourism development. Recall that when 
the government subsidy is moderate (red lines in Fig. 4), the evolutionary trajectories are not 
monotonically increasing. It implies that different initial state of each TO selecting strategy G 
and/or government subsidy may motivate the TOs to adopt different strategies in the short 
term, but the dynamical system will eventually evolve into the stable states in the long term.  
Conclusions and managerial implications 
This article focuses on the strategic interaction of green tourism innovation and price 
competition between two asymmetrical tour operators (TOs). Employing the classical 
Hotelling model and Evolutionary Game Theory, we first derive the demand functions in 
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different competitive settings considering key potential factors such as the tourists' 
environmental preference and government green subsidy. We then build a one-shot duopoly 
game model and two evolutionary game models with or without the government’s green 
subsidy.  
Our analyses and results highlight that a green tourism innovation pioneer has an 
opportunity to monopolize the burgeoning market as long as the environmental preference of 
tourists is sufficiently high. We also show that the presence of environmental preference may 
damage the TOs when they implement strategy G simultaneously. Moreover, when the 
tourists’ environmental preference is moderate, competition will significantly affect the 
decisions of TOs. When it is high enough, the stronger TO would take its opponent’s 
decisions into account but the weaker TO may not adopt the strategy G in the long run. 
Specifically for TO 2, when the environmental preference of tourists is moderate, the rate of 
weaker TO adopting green tourism innovation increases in that of stronger TO. On the 
contrary, the two adoption rates are negatively related when the environmental preference is 
sufficiently high. 
The major contributions of our research are twofold in terms of both theory and practice. 
First and foremost, a Hotelling model with green tourism innovation is developed to measure 
the effect of tourists’ environmental preference on demand functions, while many previous 
papers are empirical or case based (e.g., Chen and Tung, 2014; Han and Yoon, 2015; Rahman 
and Reynolds, 2016). These papers generally conclude that environmental awareness would 
affect tourists’ purchasing behavior. Our findings are more specific and illustrate the different 
possible impacts of environmental preference on TOs' product and pricing strategies. 
Secondly, we establish a one-shot game and two evolutionary game models to study the green 
tourism innovation interaction and pricing strategies based on the bounded rationality 
assumption theory. This is a significant theoretical contribution because many previous 
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studies have investigated the pricing strategy in the tourism industry with the complete 
rationality assumption from a short-term perspective (Chung, 2000; García and Tugores, 2006; 
Guo et al., 2013; Long and Shi, 2017). From a long-term perspective, our paper investigates 
the pricing of green or non-green tourism products and identifies potential government 
subsidy policies that can promote green tourism innovation. 
Our research results could provide useful insights for government regulators who are in 
charge of promoting sustainable tourism. Our findings suggest that to be more effective, the 
government first choose some highly competitive tourism locations and/or some innovative 
(stronger) TOs to subsidize. The findings of this paper can also help government regulators 
understand why some policies are more successful than others. For example, it might be 
believed that sustainable tourism can be developed faster with subsidies available to more 
TOs. However, according to our research, when the environmental preference of tourists is 
relatively low, the government should shift its efforts from all firms to the stronger TOs. 
Otherwise, it should pay more attention to the weaker ones. 
To address the potential limitations of this study, some assumptions used in our models 
may be relaxed or modified. For example, even though linear transportation cost and full 
market coverage assumption are widely adopted in the horizontal competition literature, it is 
worthwhile to further validate our managerial findings with other cost functional forms, such 
as quadratic cost function. Also, this article focuses on the strategy choice of green tourism 
innovation with deterministic demand. It is worthwhile studying the horizontal competition 
innovation with uncertain demand. Furthermore, this paper mainly analyzes the 
decision-making problem without considering a supply chain structure. Hence, the issue of 
multi-echelon supply chain structure can be studied in future research. Lastly, our paper 
mainly utilizes analytical model, so another future research direction is to conduct empirical 
research to validate our analytical findings. 
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Appendix A. Proofs of One-shot duopoly game of TOs 
A.1. Proof of strategy TT 
It can be proved that the second-order conditions: !!!!!!!!!!! = !!!!!!!!!!! = − !! < 0, which 
means the optimization problem Equation (2) has optimal solutions. Therefore, setting the 
first-order conditions to 0 can help us work out the optimal solutions, which are shown below: 
!!!!∗!!!!!!!!∗!! = 0!!!!∗!!!!!!!!∗!! = 0                              (A1) 
A.2. Proof of strategy GT 
It is obvious that !!!!!"!!!!!" = !!!!!"!!!!!" = − !! < 0. Therefore, we can solve the unique best 
reaction equations (A2) obtained by taking the derivative of prices on profit functions to find 
out the optimal solutions. 
!"!!!!!!!"!!!!"!!!!!!! = 0!!"!!!!!!"!!!!!"!! = 0                          (A2) 
A.2. Proof of strategy TG 
Likewise, according to the profits functions 𝜋!!"  and 𝜋!!" , we can have: !!!!!"!!!!!" =
!!!!!"!!!!!" = − !! < 0. By solving the following reaction equations, we can obtain the optimal 
solutions. 
!!"!!!!!!!"!!!!"!! = 0!"!!!!!!"!!!!!"!!!!!!! = 0                        (A3) 
A.3. Proof of strategy GG 
From the profits functions 𝜋!!!  and 𝜋!!! , we can have: !!!!!!!!!!!! = !!!!!!!!!!!! = − !! < 0 . 
Hence, the optimal solutions can be given by solving reaction equations (A4). 
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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! = 0!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! = 0                          (A4) 
The proofs of optimal solutions are completed. 
Appendix B. Proofs of evolutionary game analysis of TOs 
B.1. Simplification 𝑭 𝒙  
From Table 2, we can get excepted profits of TO 1 adopting strategy G or T and the 
average revenue of TO 1 as follows:  𝐸!! = 𝑦𝜋!!! + 1− 𝑦 𝜋!!"    𝐸!!!! = 𝑦𝜋!!" + 1− 𝑦 𝜋!!𝐸! = 𝑥𝐸!! + 1− 𝑥 𝐸!!!!                           (B1) 
According to Equation (3) and Equation (B1), we can obtain the replicator dynamic 
equation for the population of TO 1 shown in the following Equation (B2). 
! ! !!"!"!! !!!!!! !! !!!!!!!!!(!!!)!!!!! !! !!! !!!!!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!! !!! !!!"!!!!!"! !!! !!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!" !!!!!"!!!!            (B2) 
The simplification process of 𝐹 𝑦  is similar to the 𝐹 𝑥 .  
B.2. Corresponding evolutionary stability conditions of Proposition 4 
According to Equation (7), we can obtain Table B1, which demonstrate the stability of 
local equilibrium points of TOs under different conditions.   
Table B1. The stability of each local equilibrium points under 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇!. 
 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝐽 Sign 𝑇𝑟𝐽 Sign Local stability 
(0,0) ∆𝑛 ∙ ∆𝑛 − ∆𝑛 + ∆𝑛 ± Saddle point 
(0,1) −∆𝐿 ∙ ∆𝑛 + ∆𝐿 − ∆𝑛 + Unstable 
(1,0) −∆𝐿 ∙ ∆𝑛 + ∆𝐿 − ∆𝑛 − ESS 
(1,1) ∆𝐿 ∙ ∆𝐿 − −(∆𝐿 + ∆𝐿) − Saddle point 
 
Table B2. The stability of each local equilibrium points under 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < !!!!!!!! . 
 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝐽 Sign 𝑇𝑟𝐽 Sign Local stability 
(0,0) ∆𝑛 ∙ ∆𝑛 + ∆𝑛 + ∆𝑛 + Unstable 
(0,1) −∆𝐿 ∙ ∆𝑛 − ∆𝐿 − ∆𝑛 ± Saddle point 
(1,0) −∆𝐿 ∙ ∆𝑛 − ∆𝐿 − ∆𝑛 ± Saddle point 
(1,1) ∆𝐿 ∙ ∆𝐿 + −(∆𝐿 + ∆𝐿) − ESS 
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Appendix C.  Proofs for ESS of TOs with government subsidy 
C.1. Simplification 𝑭 𝒙 𝒔 
According to Table 4, we can obtain excepted profits of TO 1 adopting different 
strategies and the average revenue of TO 1 with government subsidy as follows:  𝐸!!! = 𝑦(𝜋!!! + 𝑠)+ 1− 𝑦 (𝜋!!" + 𝑠)   𝐸!!!!! = 𝑦𝜋!!" + 1− 𝑦 𝜋!!                        𝐸!! = 𝑥𝐸!!! + 1− 𝑥 𝐸!!!!!                                        (C1) 
From Equation (3) and Equation (C1), the replicator dynamic equation for the population 
of TO 1 with government subsidy is obtained and shown in the following Equation (C2). 
! ! !!!"!"!! !!!!!! !! !!!!!!!!!(!!!)!!!!! !! !!! !!!!!!!!!!! !!! !(!!!!!!)! !!! (!!!"!!) !!!!!"! !!! !!!!! !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!"!!!!" !!!!!"!!!!!!            (C2) 
The simplification process of 𝐹 𝑦 ! is similar to that of 𝐹 𝑥 !.  
The Equation (C3) and (C4) give the Jacobi matrix 𝐽! and the corresponding 𝑇𝑟𝐽! and 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝐽!. 
𝐽! = !" ! !!" !" ! !!"!" ! !!" !" ! !!" = (1− 2𝑥)(∆𝑚𝑦 + ∆𝑛 + 𝑠) 𝑥(1− 𝑥)∆𝑚𝑦(1− 𝑦)∆𝑚 (1− 2𝑦)(∆𝑚𝑥 + ∆𝑛 + 𝑠)   (C3) 𝑇𝑟𝐽! = 1− 2𝑥 ∆𝑚𝑦 + ∆𝑛 + 𝑠 + 1− 2𝑦 ∆𝑚𝑥 + ∆𝑛 + 𝑠𝐷𝑒𝑡𝐽! = 1− 2𝑥 ∆𝑚𝑦 + ∆𝑛 + 𝑠 1− 2𝑦 ∆𝑚𝑥 + ∆𝑛 + 𝑠                                                                           −𝑥(1− 𝑥)∆𝑚𝑦(1− 𝑦)∆𝑚         (C4) 
C.2. Corresponding evolutionary stability conditions of Proposition 5 
Under the precondition !!!!!!!! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇1  and 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇! , we can obtain Tables 
C1-C2 from Equation (9), which show the local stability of TOs under different government 
subsidy. 
Table C1. The stability of each local equilibrium points under 𝑠 > −∆𝐿 and !!!!!!!! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇1. 
 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝐽 Sign 𝑇𝑟𝐽 Sign Local stability 
(0,0) (∆𝑛 + 𝑠) ∙ (∆𝑛 + 𝑠) + ∆𝑛 + ∆𝑛 + 2𝑠 + Unstable 
(0,1) −(∆𝐿 + 𝑠) ∙ (∆𝑛 + 𝑠) − ∆𝐿 − ∆𝑛 ± Saddle point 
(1,0) −(∆𝐿 + 𝑠) ∙ (∆𝑛 + 𝑠) − ∆𝐿 − ∆𝑛 ± Saddle point 
(1,1) (∆𝐿 + 𝑠) ∙ (∆𝐿 + 𝑠) + −(∆𝐿 + ∆𝐿 + 2𝑠) − ESS 
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Table C2. The stability of each local equilibrium points under 𝑠 > −∆𝐿 and 𝑒𝜇! < 𝑘 < 𝑒𝜇!. 
 𝐷𝑒𝑡𝐽 Sign 𝑇𝑟𝐽 Sign Local stability 
(0,0) (∆𝑛 + 𝑠) ∙ (∆𝑛 + 𝑠) + ∆𝑛 + ∆𝑛 + 2𝑠 + Unstable 
(0,1) −(∆𝐿 + 𝑠) ∙ (∆𝑛 + 𝑠) − ∆𝐿 − ∆𝑛 ± Saddle point 
(1,0) −(∆𝐿 + 𝑠) ∙ (∆𝑛 + 𝑠) − ∆𝐿 − ∆𝑛 ± Saddle point 
(1,1) (∆𝐿 + 𝑠) ∙ (∆𝐿 + 𝑠) + −(∆𝐿 + ∆𝐿 + 2𝑠) − ESS 
 
